On May 5, 2022, the Tax Court issued the full opinion in DelPonte v. Commissioner (158 T.C. No. 7). The primary issue presented in DelPonte v. Commissioner was whether the IRS’s Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation (CCISO) or the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel has the final authority to determine whether taxpayer was entitled to innocent spouse relief when such relief is first raised as an affirmative defense in a Tax Court petition.
Held: Chief Counsel, all the way.
Background to DelPonte v. Commissioner
Michelle DelPonte separated from her ex-husband, William Goddard, in 2000. She is still, more than twenty years later, trying to untangle his affairs from her own. What concerns the Tax Court is her effort to be relieved of her liability on the joint tax returns she filed with Goddard while they were married. The part of the IRS bureaucracy that usually handles these sorts of requests thinks she’s entitled to relief. The IRS’s lawyer disagrees. The Tax Court was faced with the decision regarding “who speaks for the IRS.”
During his marriage to DelPonte, Goddard was a lawyer who sold exceptionally aggressive tax-avoidance strategies with his business partner David Greenberg and became very wealthy in the process. He tried to shelter his income from selling shelters by using the same shelter strategy he sold, but the IRS soon caught on and issued notices of deficiency for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Most of the facts surrounding Goddard’s and Greenberg’s schemes—and the audit that led to their notices of deficiency—are irrelevant to these cases. The Tax Court has already described them in detail in Greenberg v. Commissioner.
What is relevant, though, is the fact that Goddard filed joint returns with DelPonte for each of those three years. That means she is jointly and severally liable with Goddard for the several millions of dollars in tax that the Tax Court found were owed to the IRS. Thus, when the first notice of deficiency arrived in late 2004, it was addressed to “William A. and Michelle Goddard.”
DelPonte was kept in the dark about this notice. It had been sent to Goddard’s law firm, and Goddard—who had by that time been living apart from DelPonte for a few years—never told her. He instead filed a petition on her behalf asserting that she was an “innocent spouse” under IRC § 6015, apparently recognizing that he was solely responsible for the profits he had accumulated over the years and that it was only fair that he should be solely responsible for any large tax bill that might result.
The IRS sent another notice of deficiency to Goddard’s law firm in 2005 and three more in 2009. In response to each notice, Goddard filed a petition in which he asserted innocent-spouse relief on DelPonte’s behalf without telling her. It wasn’t until November 2010 that DelPonte first became aware of the deficiencies asserted against her and the ongoing litigation before us. She promptly hired her own lawyer and ratified the petitions Goddard had filed.
In April 2011, the Office of Chief Counsel referred DelPonte’s claim for innocent-spouse relief to the IRS’s Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation (CCISO) “to make a determination regarding [DelPonte’s] entitlement to such relief.” CCISO is the IRS unit that receives and processes most requests for innocent-spouse relief.
Its determination letters are generally binding on the IRS and the spouse asking for relief, but the referral letter that accompanied DelPonte’s request asked CCISO to not issue a determination letter but instead “provide the results of [its] consideration directly to [the Office of Chief Counsel].”
Having received the referral, CCISO reached out to DelPonte directly and instructed her to fill out and return a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. DelPonte did just that, and after reviewing her paperwork, CCISO concluded in December 2011 that she should be granted relief for each of the years at issue.
CCISO did what the Chief Counsel lawyer had asked. It did not send a determination letter to DelPonte, but instead sent a letter explaining its conclusion directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. And here’s where an already unusual case got even “more unusualer.”
Rather than accepting CCISO’s conclusion and settling DelPonte’s cases, the Office of Chief Counsel “decided that more information was needed…to allow [DelPonte] relief under IRC § 6015.” Thus, in August 2012 the Office of Chief Counsel invited DelPonte to participate in a Branerton conference to exchange documents and information “[i]n order for [CCISO] to properly evaluate [her] claim for relief.”
It also informed her that CCISO had already “rendered its decision in [her favor], but that [the Office of Chief Counsel] had overridden that decision.” DelPonte declined the invitation; she argued that additional information would be superfluous because CCISO had already decided she was entitled to relief and that its decision was binding on Chief Counsel.
Aside from some back-and-forth letters between DelPonte and Chief Counsel in which they argued the point, that’s where things stood for many years. In the meantime, the consolidated deficiency cases begun by Goddard and Greenberg progressed through discovery, trial, and briefing.
The Tax Court released the Tax Court’s opinion in those cases in May 2018, and in it the Tax Court upheld the IRS’s determinations of deficiencies in all respects except where he failed to meet the supervisory-approval requirement of IRC § 6751(b).
The Tax Court ordered the parties to compute the correct amounts of tax owed under Tax Court Rule 155, but in cases as complex as these, that task isn’t as simple as plugging numbers into a calculator and getting a total—the parties spent more than a year to precisely calculate the deficiencies. The Tax Court severed the five cases in which DelPonte was a petitioner in January 2020, and entered decisions in the remaining ten the following April.
Goddard and Greenberg then appealed their cases to the Eleventh Circuit in August 2020. Goddard’s cases were severed from Greenberg’s and transferred to the Ninth Circuit the following October.6 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holdings in Greenberg’s cases in August 2021, and the Ninth Circuit did likewise in December. So nearly fifteen years after the lowest numbered cases in that group had first been calendared for trial, they are now final and unappealable.
DelPonte and Chief Counsel resumed their correspondence on the innocent-spouse issue shortly after the Tax Court released the Tax Court’s opinion in the deficiency cases. DelPonte hired a new team of lawyers and responded to the Chief Counsel’s discovery requests, but she still insisted that discovery was unnecessary because CCISO had already granted her relief.
Chief Counsel stood firm in its position that CCISO didn’t speak for the IRS in her cases. DelPonte then moved for entry of decisions in her favor because, in her view, “Chief Counsel is wrong.”
The Tax Court usually get motions for entry of decision when a party wants to renege on a settlement or when parties disagree about computations under Tax Court Rule 155. In these cases, however, there is no stipulation or computation to fight about. This motion is really more like one for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether DelPonte is entitled to relief under IRC § 6015(c) because the CCISO determined that she is. And that is how the Tax Court treated DelPonte’s motion.
Congress has, since 1918, allowed married taxpayers to file joint returns, and has, since 1938, held spouses jointly and severally liable for the tax shown on those joint returns. A great many couples benefited richly from the more favorable tax rates available to joint filers, but some were burdened by the harsh consequences of joint liability.
The Tax Court commented on the harshness of this rule in Scudder v. Commissioner, when the Tax Court held a wife liable for tax on the money her husband had embezzled from the partnership she and her sisters owned and that he had unsurprisingly failed to report on their joint returns. The Tax Court found that the language of the statute was clear, and that “only remedial legislation can soften the impact of the rule of strict individual liability.”
In 1971 Congress enacted legislation to allow a spouse relief from joint and several liability in certain limited situations. Relief got a little easier in 1984, but it still required that a spouse seeking relief show that
- the joint return showed “a substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of [the other] spouse;”
- that she signed the return without knowing and without having reason to know of the substantial understatement; and
- that it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the deficiency attributable to the substantial understatement.
Neither Congress nor the IRS wed this substantive liberalization to any special procedural rules for requesting relief. The result was that spouses glommed their requests for relief onto petitions to redetermine deficiencies that they filed in the Tax Court’s Court or onto complaints for refund filed in a U.S. district court.
Congress liberalized the innocent-spouse-relief provisions again as part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998). Under new IRC § 6015, relief was available even if the understatement was not “substantial” or due to “grossly erroneous” items. Requesting spouses could seek any of three types of relief. The first requires:
- an understatement of tax on the joint return that is attributable to erroneous items of the other spouse;
- that the requesting spouse didn’t know or have reason to know of the understatement when she signed the return;
- that, “taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it [would be] inequitable to hold [that spouse] liable for the deficiency…attributable to such understatement;” and
- that the requesting spouse seek relief no later than two years after the IRS began collection activities.
The second requires the requesting spouse to:
- be legally separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse at the time of election; and
- have no actual knowledge of any items giving rise to a deficiency at the time she signed the return.
And then there is the catchall third type that requires proof only that, “taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it [would be] inequitable to hold the [requesting spouse] liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency,” and that the requesting spouse is not eligible for either of the other two types of relief.
These are known by those who have lettered in innocent-spouse relief as “b”, “c”, and “f” relief. And each of these three letters can be paired with three paths to Tax Court:
- as an issue—usually called a “defense” even though raised by a petitioner—in a deficiency case;
- in an action to review the IRS’s determination in a collection-due-process (CDP) case, a new right also created by RRA 1998; or
- in a “stand alone” action in which the Tax Court review the IRS’s administrative determination made in response to a request for relief filed by a spouse directly with the IRS.
To place DelPonte’s argument in the proper context, the Tax Court needed to sketch a bit of background for the Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction in CDP and stand-alone innocent-spouse cases.
RRA 1998 created CDP procedures to enable taxpayers to challenge how the IRS collected taxes that he assessed. This new CDP right made for a major change in the way the IRS used two of its most important collection tools—liens and levies.
Once a taxpayer’s liability has been assessed, the amount of the liability becomes a lien in favor of the government under IRC § 6321. When that happens, the IRS sends the taxpayer a notice of federal tax lien (NFTL), informing him that the lien has been filed and of his right to request a CDP hearing under IRC § 6320.
If the IRS wishes to collect tax by seizing a taxpayer’s property, he must now also send him a notice of intent to levy, which, like the NFTL, informs him of his right to a CDP hearing under IRC § 6330. Congress wedded innocent-spouse relief to CDP law by specifically providing that a spouse could raise entitlement to innocent-spouse relief in a CDP hearing.
Regulations provide that when a taxpayer raises innocent-spouse relief in a CDP hearing, the innocent-spouse issue is “governed in all respects by the provisions of…IRC § 6015 and the regulations and procedures thereunder.”
Then there’s the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in stand-alone cases. A spouse may also ask for innocent-spouse relief outside a deficiency case or a CDP hearing. If she does, and if the IRS denies her relief, she may, “[i]n addition to any other remedy provided by law,…petition the Tax Court (and [it] shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available” under IRC § 6015.
Congress wanted a requesting spouse to have only one bite from any of these three legal apples. A requesting spouse is “entitled to only one final administrative determination of relief” for a given assessment, and once the Tax Court (or a district court) has rendered a final decision on her eligibility for relief—or if she “participated meaningfully” in a court proceeding and chose not to raise a request for relief—then that spouse is barred from relief thereafter.
With that background, DelPonte’s request is for “c” relief in a deficiency case. Whether it is “b”, “c”, or “f” relief in a deficiency, CDP, or stand-alone case, a requesting spouse must navigate her way through the ever more detailed revenue procedures and regulations that the IRS started to issue after IRC § 6015’s enactment. This journey begins with the Form 8857.
The regulations requires a requesting spouse to file a Form 8857; submit a written statement containing the same information required by Form 8857; or “submit information in the manner prescribed by the Treasury and IRS in forms, relevant revenue rulings, revenue procedures, or other published guidance.”
A requesting spouse can do this any time after the IRS sends her notice of an audit or a letter that tells her there may be an outstanding liability, but no later than two years after the IRS initiates collection activity. A single claim can simultaneously request relief under IRC § 6015(b), (c), and (f).
Even through the Code is now clear that a spouse has these ways to ask for three kinds of innocent-spouse relief, it is still murky about who gets to act on those requests and whether that answer differs according to which of the three ways a spouse chooses.
IRC § 7803 creates the position of Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to whom broad powers are given to “administer, manage, conduct, direct, and supervise the execution and application of the internal revenue laws or related statutes,” as well as any other “such duties and powers as the IRS may prescribe.”
Regulations authorize the Treasury to delegate any function vested in it to the IRS, who is in turn authorized to redelegate that function to an officer or employee under his direct or indirect supervision and control.
The Treasury has of course for decades delegated to the IRS the responsibility of administering and enforcing the internal revenue laws, which includes making determinations about whether a taxpayer is entitled to innocent-spouse relief under IRC § 6015. The IRS has redelegated the responsibility for processing most requests for innocent-spouse relief to the CCISO.
There are some exceptions. In certain instances, as when there’s an ongoing audit for the year for which the requesting spouse is seeking relief, the Field Examination unit conducting the audit has authority to make the determination. Once CCISO (or the Field Examination unit) has made a preliminary determination, both the requesting spouse and the nonrequesting spouse can appeal the determination to the Office of Appeals. Appeals is responsible for holding an appeals conference, reviewing the evidence, and issuing a “final determination.”
If Appeals denies her request, a requesting spouse can petition the Tax Court’s Court for a “really truly final determination” of her entitlement to relief. The Tax Court itself can make a determination of the Tax Court’s own if CCISO or the Field Examiner doesn’t act on a request within six months.
There is a similarly complicated process when a spouse seeks relief as part of a CDP hearing. She must first file a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing (or other written and signed request), with IRS Appeals. That form allows her to check a box to claim innocent-spouse relief and, if she does, instructs her to attach a Form 8857.
IRS Appeals ordinarily sends the Form 8857 to CCISO to investigate the claim, following the same procedures as it would in a stand-alone innocent spouse case. A significant difference, though, is that Appeals retains jurisdiction over the case while CCISO investigates the claim.
One consequence of this is that CCISO ordinarily doesn’t make a final determination on what relief is appropriate. CCISO instead recommends a determination to Appeals, which is itself responsible for making a final determination about what relief if any a taxpayer should get. A disgruntled requesting spouse can once again petition us to try again.
These paths are well trod. And they may help us in the unusual situation in DelPonte’s case: where the Tax Court has a requesting spouse who raised innocent-spouse relief as an affirmative defense in deficiency petitions filed under IRC § 6213(a). DelPonte argues that the IRS has delegated authority to make a final determination to the administrative, not the litigating, side of the IRS. She has a textualist argument based on the regulations, numerous IRM provisions, the Chief Counsel’s own written guidance, and even the instructions to the Form 8857.
She also argues more purposively that her position is buttressed by the principles of horizontal equity and fundamental fairness. In short, she contends that it’s only fair that a requesting spouse raising innocent-spouse relief for the first time in litigation should have CCISO make the determination, just as if she had raised it for the first time in a stand-alone request. According to her CCISO is the decider in chief, and Chief Counsel’s job is only to defend CCISO’s determination.
The Chief Counsel, on the other hand, argues that his office is responsible for deciding what positions the IRS takes in litigation, and that decision about whether to concede innocent-spouse relief is a litigating position. He of course may ask CCISO for its advice, but he says he gets the final say.
The Chief Counsel is right that he and his lawyers are responsible for the IRS’s litigation decisions. IRC § 7803—the same section that’s the source of the IRS’s authority—also created the position of Chief Counsel, and authorized him to “perform such duties as may be prescribed by the IRS, including the duty…to represent the IRS in cases before the Tax Court.”
General Counsel Order No. 4 delegates to the Chief Counsel authority “in cases pending in the Tax Court…to decide whether and in what manner to defend, or to prosecute a claim, or to settle, or to abandon a claim or defense therein.” This order also gives the Chief Counsel the authority to redelegate any of his authority to “any officer or employee in the Office of the Chief Counsel, and to authorize further redelegation of such authority.”
The question the Tax Court must answer, then, is whether DelPonte’s request for innocent-spouse relief—and CCISO’s consideration of that request—was like any claim in a case “pending in Tax Court,” or more like an administrative request for innocent-spouse relief begun by filing a Form 8857 with CCISO.
This is a question in which a page of history enlightens us more than a volume of logic.
Ah, the ever-eloquent Judge Holmes…
Taxpayers were raising innocent-spouse claims as affirmative defenses in deficiency proceedings years before today’s administrative processes for seeking relief even existed. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to rule on those claims is part of the Tax Court’s authority under IRC § 6213(a) to redetermine a taxpayer’s deficiency when she’s received a notice of deficiency.
The Tax Court’s power in a deficiency case is not limited to the issues listed in the notice of deficiency—it includes issues raised in either the petition or answer or even those tried without objection. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to decide an issue in a deficiency case is not dependent on the IRS’s having already made a determination on that issue administratively; all the Tax Court need to get jurisdiction to decide is a timely filed petition and a valid notice of deficiency.
Once the Tax Court has jurisdiction over a case where entitlement to innocent-spouse relief is an issue, the IRS must concede or settle it with a taxpayer if he doesn’t want to litigate it. IRC § 7803(b)(2) and related delegation orders have long delegated those decisions to the Chief Counsel.
But the Chief Counsel also has the power to redelegate authority granted to him. DelPonte argues in the alternative that Chief Counsel Notice CC-2009-021 is just such a redelegation. That notice instructs attorneys in the Office of Chief Counsel to request CCISO “to make the determination” with respect to cases in which a taxpayer raises innocent-spouse relief for the first time in a deficiency petition.
That notice also states: “If CCISO…determines the the petitioner is entitled to relief, the case should be conceded…subject to the limitation that a nonrequesting spouse who is a party to the case must agree” with the determination. If the nonrequesting spouse disagrees, then “the grant of relief must be defended throughout trial and briefing.”
The Tax Court can dispense with this argument quickly. Chief Counsel has authority to delegate functions only to an “officer or employee in the Office of the Chief Counsel,” and CCISO is not within the Office of the Chief Counsel. The plain language of this order gives the Chief Counsel no authority to delegate any of his functions to CCISO.
However, even though Chief Counsel has responsibility to respond to requests for relief raised for the first time in a deficiency case, he has instructed his lawyers to adhere to CCISO determinations. Are his lawyers going rogue if they disregard this instruction?
This is not an argument based on powers of delegation, but on what DelPonte identifies as a possible protection of the Due Process Clause—a requirement that the government follow the procedures that it establishes even if it didn’t have to establish them in the first place.
DelPonte emphasizes that she doesn’t raise this issue in her present motion, but the Tax Court can head off future motion practice by noting that the Chief Counsel attorneys handling these cases have been following established procedures.
The Chief Counsel Notices
The Tax Court first addressed DelPonte’s argument that CC-2009-021 instructs Chief Counsel attorneys to refer cases to CCISO for a “determination,” not a “recommendation.” She relies heavily on the text of CC-2009-021—along with the Chief Counsel attorney’s correspondence with her and CCISO—to argue that “determinations” cannot be disregarded by Chief Counsel attorneys.
The Tax Court, however, was not convinced that use of the word “determination” in the Chief Counsel notice or any other guidance is the same as what the regulation calls a “final administrative determination.” The Tax Court has long recognized that “the name or the label of a document does not control whether the document embodies a determination.”
In CC-2009-021, the Chief Counsel repeatedly uses “should” when instructing his attorneys on how to handle cases where CCISO determines that relief should be granted, e.g., “[i]f CCISO…determines the petitioner is entitled to relief, the case should be conceded.” Elsewhere, he uses the imperative “must” when describing how an attorney should proceed in different circumstances, e.g., “[i]f the nonrequesting spouse disagrees with the Service’s determination to grant relief [to the requesting spouse], then…the grant of relief must be defended throughout trial and briefing.”
If Chief Counsel had wanted all his attorneys to accept CCISO’s determinations in every case, he could easily have conveyed that desire by telling them they “must” do so. But he did not.
CC-2009-021 is, moreover, only one of a series of notices that deal with requests for innocent-spouse relief raised for the first time in cases pending before us. CC-2009-021 was itself a supplement to the earlier Chief Counsel Notice CC-2004-26, which was issued in response to the Tax Court’s holding in Ewing v. Commissioner. The Tax Court held in Ewing that, although the Tax Court reviewed the IRS’s denial of equitable relief under IRC § 6015(f) for abuse of discretion, the Tax Court’s review was not confined to the administrative record.
CC-2004-26 included instructions for how Chief Counsel attorneys should handle IRC § 6015(f) cases to keep the scope-of-review issue alive for appeal. It also sought to solve the problem of how to handle requests for equitable relief that were raised for the first time before us—either in deficiency petitions or after six months had passed since the taxpayer requested relief—and in such cases there would be no administrative record to review.
His solution was to have those cases remanded to CCISO for a determination and to create an administrative record. The notice told CCISO to “send all evidence the petitioner presented…and its written analysis to the Chief Counsel attorney handling the docketed case. If CCISO determines the petitioner is entitled to relief, the Chief Counsel attorney should consider whether settlement is appropriate.”
CC-2009-021 itself was prompted by the Tax Court’s opinions in Porter v. Commissioner (Porter I), and Porter v. Commissioner (Porter II), in which the Tax Court held that it would conduct trials de novo in innocent-spouse cases, and make its own determinations about relief under IRC § 6015(f) with no deference to the IRS.
Like its predecessor, CC-2009-021 provided guidance to the Chief Counsel lawyers on how to preserve these issues for appeal. It also told Chief Counsel attorneys that they should continue asking CCISO to make determinations in all IRC § 6015 cases, and they should continue to concede cases where CCISO determined the requesting spouse was entitled to relief.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2013-011, issued after Wilson v. Commissioner, confirmed that IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A) provided for both a de novo standard and scope of review in IRC § 6015(f) cases, and rendered both these older notices obsolete. This notice was published after CCISO had already rendered its decision on DelPonte’s request, but the Tax Court believe it is still helpful in understanding the Chief Counsel’s guidance that was in effect.
CC-2013-011 again requires that Chief Counsel attorneys request a determination from CCISO where a petitioner requests relief under any provision of IRC § 6015. It also clarifies that “the trial attorney should, except in rare circumstances, follow the determination made by CCISO that the petitioner is entitled to relief and settle the case in accordance with CCISO’s determination.”
And This Leads to the Ultimate Dénouement in DelPonte v. Commissioner
The “should” instead of a “must” means that in this context the CCISO’s decisions are advisory. Therefore, Chief Counsel attorneys get to make the final decision about the IRS’s views on any particular request for innocent-spouse relief when a taxpayer seeks it in a deficiency case.
Looping Back to the IRM
The Tax Court then “zoom[s] out to look one last time at the IRM.” It says that if innocent-spouse relief is raised for the first time in a case already docketed in court, “[j]urisdiction is retained by…Counsel, and a request is sent to CCISO to consider the request for relief.” It specifies that “Counsel…has functional jurisdiction over the matter and handles the case and request for relief, and either settles or litigates the issue on its merits, as appropriate.”
The Tax Court, therefore, held in DelPonte v. Commissioner that the Chief Counsel notices and the IRM all tell CCISO to provide “assistance,” not to make a final determination, and that Chief Counsel attorneys retain their discretion to adopt or reject CCISO’s conclusions.
- T.C. Memo. 2018-74, aff’d, 10 F.4th 1136 (11th Cir. 2021), and aff’d sub nom. Goddard v. Commissioner, No. 20-73023, 2021 WL 5985581 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021). ↑
- See IRC § 6013(d)(3). ↑
- IRM pt. 188.8.131.52 (Dec. 12, 2016). ↑
- See IRM 184.108.40.206.1(2). ↑
- Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919); see also Camara v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 317, 327 (2017). ↑
- Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476; see also Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2013). ↑
- See Wilson, 705 F.3d at 983. ↑
- 48 T.C. 36 (1967), remanded by 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968) ↑
- Id. at 41. ↑
- Act of January 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063 (codified at IRC § 6013(e)). ↑
- see Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801 (codified at IRC § 6013). ↑
- Id. ↑
- See Corson v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 354, 358 (2000); T.D. 7320, 1974-2 C.B. 391. ↑
- See Corson, 114 T.C. at 358. ↑
- (RRA 1998), Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified as amended at IRC § 6015) ↑
- IRC § 6015(b). ↑
- IRC § 6015(c). ↑
- IRC § 6015(f). ↑
- See RRA 1998 § 3401, 112 Stat. at 746 (codified as amended at IRC § 6320 and IRC § 6330). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(2), 301.6330-1(e)(2). ↑
- IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(c)(1). ↑
- See IRC § 6015(g)(2). ↑
- T.D. 9003, 2002-2 C.B. 294. ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(a). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(5). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1)(a)(2). ↑
- IRC § 7803(a)(2). ↑
- Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-9(b) and (c). ↑
- I.R.S. Treas. Order 150-10 (Apr. 22, 1982) ↑
- See IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A)(i), (5), (f). ↑
- IRM pt. 220.127.116.11. ↑
- See IRM 18.104.22.168(4). ↑
- IRM 22.214.171.124.3. ↑
- IRC § 6015(e). ↑
- IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A). ↑
- IRM pt. 126.96.36.199.2. ↑
- See Form 12153 (Rev. Nov. 2006). ↑
- See IRM pt. 188.8.131.52.1.5.3. ↑
- See IRM pt. 184.108.40.206.11.3(6). ↑
- See IRM pt. 220.127.116.11.11.3(4). ↑
- See IRM pt. 18.104.22.168.11.3.1 and .2. ↑
- Id. ↑
- IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A). ↑
- IRC § 7803(b)(2)(D). ↑
- See IRM pt. 30.2.2-.6. ↑
- Id. ↑
- See Corson, 114 T.C. at 363-64 (“In a deficiency proceeding, the Tax Court may take into account all facts and circumstances relevant to ascertaining the correct amount of the deficiency, including affirmative defenses”). ↑
- See Ax v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 153, 160 (2016). ↑
- Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 288 (2000) (citing Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 533 (1985)). ↑
- See IRM pt. 30.2.2-.6. ↑
- CC-2009-021, at 2. ↑
- Id. at 4. ↑
- Id. ↑
- IRM pt. 30.2.2-.6. ↑
- IRM pt. 22.214.171.124.3.3. ↑
- See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5. ↑
- Wilson v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 47, 53 (2008). ↑
- CC-2009-021, at 4 (emphasis added). ↑
- Id. (emphasis added). ↑
- 122 T.C. 32 (2004), rev’d and vacated, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). ↑
- Ewing, 122 T.C. at 38-39. ↑
- CC-2004-026, at 1-2. ↑
- Id. at 3. ↑
- Id. at 4 (emphasis added). ↑
- 130 T.C. 115 (2008). ↑
- 132 T.C. 203 (2009), CC-2009-021, at 1. ↑
- Porter I, 130 T.C. at 125. ↑
- Porter II, 132 T.C. at 210 ↑
- CC-2009-021, at 2. ↑
- Id. at 2-4. ↑
- 705 F.3d 980. ↑
- CC-2013-011, at 1-2. ↑
- Id. at 3 (emphasis added). ↑
- IRM pt. 126.96.36.199.2(1). ↑
- IRM pt. 188.8.131.52.2(3). ↑